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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GEORGE A. LOWE COMPANY a 
corporation, THE SALT LAKE 
HARDWARE COMPANY, a corpora-
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HARDWARE COMPANY, a cor-
poration, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
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OF UTAH, DONALD HACKING, 
Chairman, W. R. MciNTYRE and 
OSCAR W. CARLESON, Commis-
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This case results from an application by the peti-
tioners for a writ of prohibition against the Public 
Service Commission of Utah prohibiting it from attempt-
ing to assume jurisdiction over the petitioners and for-
bidding them the use of the public highways of the State 
of Utah in the transportation by the petitioners of the 
goods, wares and merchandise of the :petitioners by motor 
• 
vehicle upon the public highways of the state. Respond-
ents replied asserting that petitioners were contract 
carriers by motor vehicle and, as such, subject to the 
jurisdiction of the commission. All facts in the case 
have been stipulated and, in the broad sense, the only 
question in the case is whether or not the Public Service 
Commission may legally and constitutionally exercise 
jurisdiction over the petitioners in their operations of 
trans1porting their merchandise by motor vehicle. 
FACTS 
I. 
During the month of October, 1948, the petitioners 
herein entered into the following agreement: 
AGREEMENT 
This Agreement entered into this ____________ day 
of October, 1948, by and between the GEORGE 
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.A.. LO''TE CO~IP ANY of Ogden, Utah; THE 
S.A.LT L~:\I~E HARD\V-ARE COMPANY of Salt 
Lake City~ Utah: and STREVELL-P ATER-
SOX HARD,~V ... \RE COMP AN1... of Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
,,~HERE ... t\.S, the parties hereto and each of 
then1 have goods of their own which from time to 
time they desire to transport between Salt Lake 
City and Ogden, lTtah, and 
'';HEREAS, the parties hereto have agreed 
to rent automotive equipment, to-=wit, a truck or 
trucks, to transport the said goods. 
IT IS HEREBY MUTUALLY A·GREED as 
follows: 
1. That the parties hereto each agree to em-
ploy a supervisor and a person or persons to drive 
said truck, and 
2. That each of the parties hereto hereby 
agrees to pay the sup·ervisor his salary for the 
separate time he is employed by it and to pay the 
truck driver the salary for the pro rata time he 
operates for it, and 
3. Each of the parties hereto hereby agrees 
to pay his separate pro rata share of any rentals 
and expenses of said automotive equipment, and 
4. That each of the parties hereto is to direct 
the operation of the said employees as to its sepa-
rate use of said equipment and said employees. 
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Signed THE SALT LAKE HARDWARE 
CoMPANY 
GEORGE A. LowE-COMPANY 
STREVELL - pATERSON HARD-
WARE CoMPANY 
II. 
Pursuant to said agreement the petiti~oners rented 
a truck and employed a driver therefor, and have 
hauled and will continue to haul over the highways of 
the state products belonging to the petitioners and the 
products of no one else. 
III. 
Each of the petitioners pay the ~expenses of such 
operation according to the pro rata share of use of each 
petitioner of the truck facilities so employed and in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement hereinbe-
fore set forth. 
IV. 
I 
The 'Petitioners have never applied for and have 
never been granted a permit to operate as a contract 
carrier in intra-state commerce. 
v. 
The Public Service Commission of Utah has in-
formed the p~etitioners it will take necessary legal 
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7 
steps to prevent the continued operation in accordance 
with the plan being carried on by the petitioners. 
··vi. 
Pursuant to said agreement hereinbefore set forth, 
each of your petitioners herein pays the owner ·Of the 
truck for each petitioner's share of the rental thereof. 
Each petitioner herein pays the truck driver for each 
petitioner's share ·of the salary of the truck driver. 
Each of your petitioners severally pays his pro rata 
share of the gasoline, oil and other incidental e~penses 
of the said truck. 
QUESTIONS 
In the opinion of your petitioners there are three 
questions involved. 
I. 
DO THE OPERATIONS OF THE PETITIONERS 
HE'REIN CONSTITUTE A PARTNERSHIP? 
II. 
DO THE TRANSACTIONS CONDUCTED BY 
THE PETITIO·NERS COME WITHIN THE MEAN-
ING OF THE STATUTES OF . UTAH, TO-WIT: 
SECTION 76-5-13, U.C.A., 1943, AS AMENDED.''*:** 
C'C>NTRACT MOTOR CARRIER O·F PROPERTY 
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8 
MEANS ANY PERSON ENGAGED IN THE TRANS-
PORTATION BY MOTOR VEHICLE OF PROP-
ERTY FOR HIRE AND NOT INCLUDED IN THE 
TERM, COMMON MOTOR CARRIER AS HEREIN-
BEFORE DEFINED. * * *" )? 
III. 
DOES THE INTERPRETATION OF THE COM-
MISSION CONTRAVENE THE CONSTITUTIONS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND THE UNITED 
STATES~ 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DO THE OPERATIONS. OF THE PETITIONERS 
HEREIN CONSTITUTE A PARTNERSHIP~ 
Petitioners herein claim that this question is im-
material, but since the commission is insistent that it has 
a bearing on the case the petitioners herewith answer it. 
Section 69-1-3, U.·C.A., 1943, reads as follows: 
''A partnership is an association of two or more 
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit. 
·* * * '' 
The uniform partnership act, Section 6, is identical. 
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It is obYious that this is not an association ''to carry on 
as co-o,,~ners a business for profit'' .or at all. First, this 
is not a business. Second, the petitioners herein are 
not co-o,vners of anything. Third, there is no 1profit, 
but all out-go fron1 the petitioners herein; the transac-
tions engaged herein by the petitioners cannot eonceiv .. 
ably result in a profit. 
Bentley Y. Brossard, 33 U 396; 94 P 736, 7 41, states: 
''As to the general principles involved, and 
particularly applicable to the case, we find no 
better statement of the rule than that of Mr. 
Justice Gray in the case of Meehan v. Valentine, 
145 U. S. 611, 12 Supreme Court 972, 36 L. Ed. 
835, as follows : 'The requisites of a partnership 
are that the parties must have joined together 
to carry on a trade or adventure for their common 
benefit, each contributing property or services, 
and having a community of interest in the profits.' 
After reviewing the authorities it was further 
observed by him: 'In the present state of the law 
upon this subject it may perhaps be doubted whet-
her any more precise general rule can be laid 
down than as indicated at the beginning of this 
opinion, that those partners are persons who con-
tribute either property or money to carry on a 
joint business for their common benefit, and who 
own and share the profits thereof in certain ~~ro­
portions. If they do this, the incidents or conse-
quences follow that the acts of one in conducting 
the partnership business are the acts of all; that 
each is agent f~r the firm and for the other part-
ners; that each receives part of the profits as pro-
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fits, and takes p~rt of the fund ·to which the credi-
tors of ~ partnership have a right to look for 
the payment ·of their debts; that all are liable as 
partners u1pon contracts made by any of them 
with third persons within the scope of the partner-
ship business; and that even an ·express stipula-
tion between the~ that one shall not be so liable, 
though good between themselves, is ineffectual 
as against third persons. And participating in 
profits is presumptive, but not conclusive, evi-
dence of •partnership.' '' 
T~e ~g~~eme~t ente~ed into by a:p.d b~tween your 
petitioners does not l>roviq~ for the essential requisites 
of partnership. There is no joint own.ership of prop-
erty, no profits in which your pe~itioners can participate, 
no sharing of ex•penses on the same basis as in a part-
~ f ' ' ' - ' I 
nership. There is n9. agency of one petitio:J;ler for another 
£or any purpose whatsoever. There is no. carrying on 
of a trad~, adventure or business for the petitioners 
~ommon benefit. The ~~ve~ture herein_, if any such 
there he, is for their severa~ benefits as stated in the 
agreement. No one of the p.etitione.rs contributes any 
services or property to the others, whatsoever, as clearly 
designated in the agreement. They do not have any 
community of interest in profits because the very nature 
of the transaction precludes any profits. The only agree-
ment, either written or o~al, or expressed or implied, in 
existence by and between the petitioners is the agree-
ment herein above set forth, insofar as trans1porting 
PJ'Operty by motor vehicle is concerned. 
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40 American Jurisprudence 127, states: 
"~ ,~Vhile it is sometimes difficult * * * to dis-
tig-uish in particular cases between joint adven-
tures and partnerships, since the relations of ~the 
parties to a joint adventure and the nature of 
their association are so similar and closely akin 
to a partnership, yet the two relationships are not 
identical. The outstanding difference is that a 
joint adventure relates to a single transaction, 
although it may comprehend a business. to be con-
tinued over several years, while a partnership 
relates to a general and continuing business of a 
particular kind. '' 
The Agreement by and between the petitioners does 
not provide for any business whatever being carried on 
separate and distinct from their several businesses and 
that the functions "QTI.der the said agreement are inci-
dental and ~elate only to their several principal business 
endeavors. That, as a matter of fact, none of the several 
businesses of the petitioners is transportation or com-
mon carrier or private carrier business. Each of the 
petitioners is in the wholesale hardware business and the 
transportation of their merchandise is merely inciden-
tal and essential to their several princi•pal businesses, 
and the transportation facilities and transactions under 
the agreement by and between the parties are several 
and distinct and not a community of interest whatever. 
II. 
DO THE TRANSACTIONS CONDUCTED BY 
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THE PETITIONERS COME WITHIN THE MEAN-
ING OF THE STATUTES OF UTAH DE·FINING 
CONTRACT CARRIERS~ 
It is agreed by and between the parties hereto that 
the petitioners herein are not common motor carriers 
of vroperty. The sole question is whether or not they 
are contract carriers. The definition is given in the 
statute as '' * * * Contract Motor Carrier of property 
means any person engaged in the transportation by 
motor vehicle of property for hire and not included in 
the term, common motor carrier as hereinbefore defined. 
* * *" The contention of your 1petitioners herein is that 
they are neither individually or jointly hauling any 
property whatsoever for hire by motor vehicle. Holmes 
v. Railroad Commission of California, 242 P 486, 490; 
(A California case) states: 
''One, who transports merely his own goods, 
is of necessity engaged in some business other 
than tr~ans;portation, and the transportation of 
such goods is no more than an incident to such 
business. So, also, one, who transports the goods 
of another as a servant or agent of such other, is 
not engaged in the b-q.siness of transportation, 
but in so doing is engaged in the business of his 
master or principal, whatever that business may 
be. But one, who engages as an independent 
calling in the transportation of goods for another 
or for others under contract and for compensa-
tion, is engaged in the business of transportation 
and is a carrier. ' ' 
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The above quotation in the above case was quoted 
and approved in the case of Board of Railroad Com-
missioners, et al, against Gan1ble-Robinson Company, 
et al, Sup. Ct. of Montana, 111 Pac 2nd 307, at page 309. 
In the above Montana case the court stated: 
• "Thus the question is \vhether in enacting 
the statute the legislature meant merely to super-
vise and regulate those engaged in the busines~ 
of transporting persons and property for hire, 
or also to supervise and regulate all those en-
gaged in other businesses and using motor vehi-
cles purely for the incidental purpose of deliver-
ing their o"\vn goods in the course of such busines-
ses. The former would seem to be the clear in-
tent, since the title of the Act expressed an in-
tention to supervise, regulate and control 'Motor 
Carriers Engaged in the Transportation by Motor 
Vehicles of Pers·ons and Property for Hire,' etc.' 
'To engage' is' to. embark in a business.' Webster's 
New International Dictionary, Merriam Webster, 
2d Ed. The defendants are engaged in wholesal-
ing just as ranchers are engaged in ranching. 
They are not ordinarily understood to be 'engaged 
in' every occupation or activity purely incidental 
to their business. One engaged in either of those 
businesses and using motor vehicles for purposes 
incidental thereto cannot properly be said to be 
engaged in the transportation of goods, and the 
title of th·e Act cannot logically be said to have 
given notice to the public or legislature of ·an 
intent to regulate their -use of the highways.'' 
A full reading of the opinion in this case is very en-
lightning on the subject here in issue. 
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. In Christy Transfer and Storage Company v. Hatch 
(Thompson et al, Interveners) Supreme court of Mon-
tana 28 P 2d 470, an action was brought by a common 
carrrier to enjoin Defendant Hatch from using the high-
ways of the state as a motor carrier. In this case the 
interveners entered into an agreement with Defendant. 
Hatch, whereby the interveners agreed to purchase a 
described motor truck from the defendant. The truck 
"\Vas to be used exclusively for hauling and transporting 
merchandise sold or purchased by interveners and for 
delivery to each other or to the customers of each other. 
The ex1penses of upkeep, including wages for necessary 
help, management and use of the truck and the purchase 
price thereof were paid monthly on the basis and ratio of 
the rate of merchandise carried f.or each per mile. By 
its terms Hatch was employed as Transportation Mana-
ger at not less than $6.00 per day together with a bonus 
for good service whenever a majority of the interveners 
so determined. The question presented in this case was 
virtually identical with the question at bar. The facts 
of the case at bar are more strongly for the !petitioners 
than in the case cited. The court stated on page 471: 
''The act as disclosed by its title affects only 
motor carriers engaged in the transportation of 
persons and property for hire. It defines a 'Motor 
Carrier' as a 'person or corporation, their lesse·es, 
trustees, or receivers appointed by any court 
whatsoever, ·operating motor vehicles upon any 
public highway in the State of Montana for the 
transportation of persons and/or property for 
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hire, on a com1nercial basis either as a common 
earrier or under priYate contract, agreement, 
charter, ·or undertaking.' " 
At page 472 the court states "for hire" is defined 
in the act as follows: 
''The 'vords 'for hire' mean for remuneration 
of any kind, paid or promised, either directly or 
indirect! y. ' ' 
The court held in this case that the Defendant and Inter-
veners are not motor carriers engaged in the business 
"for hire" within the meaning of the Montana Act. The 
court further stated : 
''Interveners are simply using 'their own 
truck to transport their own merchandise ; They 
do not operate for hire. Defendant is merely the 
employee of interveners and is likewise not 
operating for hire, within the meaning of the act." 
For hire means a payment to another for services ren-
dered. One of the questions in the case at bar is: Who 
paid whom and for what? The only 1payments made by 
any of the several petitioners are payments directly as 
salary to its employee, the truck driver, payments of 
its several pro rata share of the truck rental, for the gas, 
oil and maintenance used in the truck hauling its several 
goods. At no place in the operation is there any payment 
by any of these petitioners to any other petitioner or 
to the petitioners as a. group for the transportation of 
its several goods. 
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'To further illustrate, counsel quotes from the case 
of Board of Railroad Commissioner v. Gamble-Robinson, 
et al, suvra, which at page 311 states: 
''It necessarily follows from what has been 
said that the defendants are not within the statute 
and cannot be denied the use of Montana streets 
and highways as an incident to the conduct of 
their lawful business, nor be required to apply to 
plaintiffs for a certificate of public convenience 
or necessity as a prerequisite to such use.'' 
III. 
DOES THE INTERPRETATIO·N OF THE COM-
MISSION CONTRAVENE THE CONSTITUTIONS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND THE UNITED 
STATES~ 
The commission, it is believed by petitioners, will 
agree that if any of ~the several petitioners had individ-
ually rented a truck and hired a truck driver and hauled 
its goods that he would not be subject to the motor 
vehicle transportation act and if he was so subject, the 
act would be unconstitutional. Therefore, in the above 
arguments to the first question, it is contended and 
argued, and the petitioners have shown that the acts 
under the agreement by and between the petitioners in 
this matter were several and individual. If the con-
tentions, in the first two questions, of the petitioners 
are well taken then for the commission to proceed with 
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its intended actions "~ould be a violation of the indi-
vidual petitioner's constitutional rights as guaranteed by 
the Constitution of the State of Utah and the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. If the 
act may be interpreted as the commission desires to 
interpret it said act "\Vould be unconstitutional under the 
Constitution of the State of Utah in that it would be 
unreasonable classification. There is no more reason 
at law for holding that a company may not haul its own 
goods at its own expense upon the highways of the State 
of Utah for its own benefit than tha't a doctor could not 
haul his medical kit, or a farmer could not haul his 
produce to market, or a grocer could not deliver his 
groceries, or a plumber could not haul his supplies from 
his shop to the place "\vhere he is to do the work, or a 
carpenter could not haul his tools and lumber, or a 
lawyer his brief case, supplies and books from his office 
to the court house, or a Justice of the Supreme Court 
take his books home from the library for study and 
bring them back. Each is transporting goods for his 
benefit. This was brought out in the well reasoned dis-
senting opinion in Holmes v. Railroad Commission, 
supra. On page 493, the court stated: 
''In determining the persons by whom the 
highways may be used, the state has no povver, in 
my judgment, under the guise of prohibiting com-
petition, to deny to its citizens the right to use 
the public highways for their own private pur-
;poses, vvhether for business or pleasure.'' 
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On page 492, it was stated : 
''By the same reasoning the Legislature 
could vest the commission with power to prohibit 
the use of private passenger automobiles operat-
ing on the public highway because such use would 
be in ·competition with regulated common carriers 
of passengers with possible destruction of the 
business of the latter. Such a result may not 
he contemplated as within the power of the 
state * * * ". 
In the case of Michigan Public Utilities Commission 
v. Duke, 26'6 U.S. 570, 69 L. Ed. 445 Duke had 1employed 
45 men and 47 motor trucks as a motor carrier under 
3 private contracts for the transportation of automobile 
bodies from Detroit to T·oledo. The United States Su-
preme Court on page 450 states : 
''Moreover, it is beyond the power of the 
state by legislative fiat to convert property used 
exclusively in the business of a ~)rivate carrier 
into ·a public utility, or to make the owner a public 
carrier, for that would be taking private property 
for public use without just compensation, which 
no state can do consistently with the due process 
of law clause of the 14th Amendment." 
CONCLUSIONS 
Your petitioners maintain that they do not consti-
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tute a partnership, that they do n·ot haul any goods for 
hire and hence are not subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Public Service Commission of lTtah. 
Your petitioners pray that the temporary writ of 
prohibition be made permanent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MUSSER AND GIB·SON 
Attorneys for P·etitioners 
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